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On April 15, 2010 President Barak Obama made the official announcement that the 
Constellation Program, which included the Ares I launch vehicle, would be canceled.  
NASA’s Ares I launch vehicle was being designed to launch the Orion Crew Exploration 
Vehicle, returning humans to the moon, Mars, and beyond.  It consisted of a First Stage (FS) 
five segment solid rocket booster and a liquid J-2X Upper Stage (US) engine.  Roll control 
for the FS was planned to be handled by a dedicated Roll Control System (RoCS), located on 
the connecting interstage.  Induced yaw or pitch moments experienced during FS ascent 
would have been handled by vectoring of the booster nozzle.  After FS booster separation, 
the US Reaction Control System (ReCS) would have provided the US Element with three 
degrees of freedom control as needed.      
The best practices documented in this paper will be focused on the technical designs and 
producibility of both systems along with the partnership between NASA and Boeing, who 
was on contract to build the Ares I US Element, which included the FS RoCS and US ReCS.  
In regards to partnership, focus will be placed on integration along with technical work 
accomplished by Boeing.  This will include detailed emphasis on task orders developed 
between NASA and Boeing that were used to direct specific work that needed to be 
accomplished.  In summary, this paper attempts to capture key best practices that should be 
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ADC = Advanced Development Contract  
CAD = Computer Aided Design                                                  
CDR = Critical Design Review 
CEV = Crew Exploration Vehicle 
CxP = Constellation Program 
DAC = Design Analysis Cycle  
DOF = Degrees of Freedom  
ESTS = Engineering, Science, and Technical 
Services 
°F = Degree Fahrenheit 
FOM = Figures of Merit  
FS = First Stage   
FT = Fault Tolerant 
GHe = Gaseous Helium 
GN2 = Gaseous Nitrogen  
GN&C = Guidance Navigation and Control 
HFTA = Hot Fire Test Article                                                        
Isp  = Specific Impulse 
lbf = Pound Force                                                              
lbm = Pound Mass 
LOX = Liquid Oxygen 
MAF = Michoud Assembly Facility  
MDC  = Mission Duty Cycle  
MDP  = Maximum Design Pressure   






MGA = Mass Growth Allowance    
MMH = Monomethylhydrazine 
MPS = Main Propulsion System 
MSFC = Marshall Space Flight Center 
MTO = Mass to Orbit 
NASA = National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
NDT = NASA Design Team 
N2H4 = Hydrazine 
NTO = Nitrogen Tetraoxide 
PDR = Preliminary Design Review 
psi = Pounds per Square Inch 
psia = Pounds per Square Inch Absolute 
psid = Pounds per Square Inch Differential 
RCS = Reaction Control System 
ReCS = Reaction Control System 
RoCS = Roll Control System 
SCI = Source Controlled Item 
SDTA = System Development Test Article 
sec = Second 
SRB = Solid Rocket Booster  
TBD = To Be Determined 
TBR = To Be Resolved 
TPS = Thermal Protection System 
US = Upper Stage 






 The Ares I launch vehicle was being developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
at the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) in Huntsville, Alabama, from 2006 to 2010 as part of the Constellation 
Program (CxP).  The vehicle was slated to replace the Space Shuttle for manned spaceflight and was being designed 
by the NASA Design Team (NDT), with component selection, procurement, and production being handled by the 
Upper Stage Production Contractor (USPC), Boeing.  The Ares I was configured in two inline stages: a Space 
Shuttle derived five-segment Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) First Stage (FS) and an Upper Stage (US) powered by a 
Saturn V derived J-2X engine.  Roll control for the FS was planned to be handled by a dedicated Roll Control 
System (RoCS), located on the connecting Interstage with induced yaw and pitch moments being handled by booster 
nozzle thrust vectoring.  The FS SRB was designed to operate for approximately two minutes after which point the 
FS would separate from the vehicle ending the mission of the FS RoCS.  Post-separation and prior to the generation 
of full J-2X thrust, the US Reaction Control System (ReCS) was designed to provide three-degrees of freedom 
control for the vehicle.  After the J-2X ignited, the US ReCS would have continued to provide roll control for the 
vehicle.  Nozzle vectoring of J2-X would counteract any induced yaw or pitch moments.  Between J2-X engine 
shutdown and commanded crew vehicle separation, the US ReCS would again provide 3-degree of freedom attitude 
control. 
 The focus of this paper is to relay some of the key best practices and lessons learned from the NDT design and 
development of the FS RoCS and US ReCS, as well as Boeing’s producibility work, and the partnership between the 
two teams.  The Ares I was somewhat unique for man-rated launch vehicle design as it was a government-led in-
house design, with the NDT serving as the role of the traditional Prime Contractor.  Boeing, who was competitively 
selected as the USPC, was responsible for the selection, procurement, and production of all of the components and 
hardware that the NDT had specified for the two systems.  A representation of the Ares I launch vehicle in the 
stacked configuration with the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) is shown in Figure 1. 
The FS RoCS flight design incorporated a distributed, pressure-regulated Gaseous Helium (GHe) pressurization 
system, with localized sets of monopropellant Hydrazine (N2H4) tanks.  The FS RoCS configuration had two 
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thruster modules that were 180o apart, with a 
pair of localized propellant tanks located 
behind each thruster module inside the 
Interstage surface. The overall FS RoCS 
architecture included: pressurant loading, 
pressurant storage, pressurant regulation and 
isolation, propellant loading, propellant 
storage, consumable acquisition, propellant 
delivery, and thruster assemblies to deliver 
the required impulse and moment generation 
capability.  This architecture provided one 
failure tolerance for function and prevention 
of catastrophic hazards, such as inadvertent 
thruster firing, bulk propellant leakage, and 
over-pressurization. 
The pressurization system included two 
ambient-referenced regulators on parallel 
strings to attain the required system level 
single Fault Tolerance (FT) for function. A 
single burst disk and relief valve assembly 
was included to ensure single FT for must-
not-occur catastrophic hazards.  
The system was designed to support the 
simultaneous firing of multiple thrusters as 
required to counteract roll torque 
disturbances.  Each thruster module contained 
six 625-lbf thrusters (three each in the 
positive and negative roll directions), four 
acting as primary thrusters and two as 
redundant thrusters.  The thruster flowrate 
was approximately 3.0 lbm/sec at the rated thrust.  All thrusters were in an inline configuration (catalyst chamber 
and nozzle), with nozzle centerlines being parallel to the Y-Z plane of the vehicle.  Each thruster assembly 
centerline was canted 20o relative to the tangent of the interstage outer wall in order to reduce plume thermal effects 
and subsequent Interstage Thermal Protection System (TPS) mass. The baseline design also incorporated series 
redundant, pneumatically actuated thruster valves.   
Propellant was stored in four supply tanks, with two located in a localized configuration behind each thruster 
module inside the Interstage structure.  Propellant tanks were an all-metal cylindrical design, with elastomeric 
diaphragms being used for positive expulsion. The total propellant mass was approximately 1136 lbm with 40 lbm 
of that being unusable.  The volume and dry mass for each propellant tank was approximately 8115 cubic inches 
(in3) and 40.0 lbm with the nominal and Maximum Expected Operating Pressures (MEOP) approximately 639 and 
793 psia respectively.  The distributed pressurization subsystem was located along the inner wall of the Interstage, 
approximately halfway between the thruster modules and is comprised of three high-pressure helium storage tanks 
and a Helium Pressurant Module (HPM).  Each of the high pressure, cylindrical composite over-wrapped GHe 
pressurant tanks were designed to operate at a maximum helium pressure of 4500 psia and have an internal volume 
of approximately 8438 in3 and an estimated weight of 74.0 lbm. The total amount of GHe to be loaded was 
estimated at 35 lbm, with 21.5 lbm being unusable due to end of mission pressure and temperature constraints as 
well as the rapid mission usage timeline.   A common pressurant system was used for both propellant tank 
pressurization and actuation of the pneumatic thruster valves due to commonality of operating pressure levels.  
Additionally, helium manual valves and service valves were added to facilitate propellant loading of the localized 
propellant tanks from the service panel.   
Figure 1.  Layout of the Ares I Launch Vehicle and 
Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle 
First Stage Roll 
Control System 
(FS RoCS) 
Upper Stage Reaction 
Control System 
(US ReCS) 
  First Stage Solid Rocket 
Booster (Ares I) 
Interstage (Ares I) 
Upper Stage (Ares I) 
Orion  
(Crew Exploration Vehicle) 
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The FS RoCS configuration was designed to 
facilitate draining, purging, and decontamination of 
the propellant system. The service panel (which 
contains the fill/drain valves) was located on the 
outside of the Interstage wall to allow access to the 
service valves from outside the vehicle. A liquid 
trap/low point was located on the propellant fill/drain 
lines. A purge line was located at the top of each 
thruster module and routed back to the service panel. 
Two service valves, one for the +ZS thruster module 
and one for the –ZS thruster module, provided a 
continuous purge circuit for each module and was used 
in conjunction with the propellant manifold designed 
to facilitate faster draining. The outer diameter of the 
fill/drain line was ½” to ensure adequate drain and 
decontamination performance.  The final configuration 
of the fluid system schematic and CAD representation 
of the FS RoCS, as configured for attachment to the 
Interstage, is shown in Figure 2. 
The US ReCS configuration was a distributed 
monopropellant N2H4 blowdown propulsion system.  It 
had two thruster modules 180° apart on the outer 
diameter of the US Aft Skirt.  US ReCS architecture 
included pressurant loading and storage, propellant 
loading and storage, acquisition and delivery system, 
and thrusters.  The thrusters utilized a catalyst bed 
along with a 90° turn flow nozzle due to reliability and 
cost.  They were also sized to meet the US ReCS 
impulse, moment, duty cycle, electric pulse width, 
impulse life, impulse bit, and thrust level 
requirements.  This architecture provided one fault 
tolerance for function and one fault tolerance against 
catastrophic hazards during ground and flight 
operations.    
The US ReCS was designed to operate for 
approximately eight minutes following US element 
separation from the FS element.  Nominal operation of 
the US ReCS occurred under various conditions 
experienced during the mission.  These conditions 
included vibration/shock, hot environments, cold 
environments, and structural loads.  Vibration and 
shock conditions would have occurred throughout the 
non-operational and operational phases of the US ReCS.  The most intense of these conditions was the shock 
generated during the separation of the US from the FS. 
To properly function, the US ReCS needed to survive the expected vibration conditions, which would have 
occurred during launch and the FS element operational phase.  The US ReCS was expected to have experienced 
potentially large temperature variations due to proximity of the cryogenic storage tanks of the US MPS.  The US 
ReCS was located in close proximity to the J-2X and during planned operation would have also been exposed to 
higher temperatures generated by the J-2X and its plume.  The US ReCS propellant tank would have also 
experienced lower temperatures due to its location on the thrust cone of the US element.  The thrust cone was 
located on the aft dome of the Liquid Oxygen (LOX) tank providing LOX to the J-2X.  The final configuration of 
the fluid system schematic and CAD representation of the US ReCS, as configured for attachment to the Aft Skirt of 
the LOX tank of the US, is shown below in Figure 3.  For additional design and development details on the Ares I 
FS RoCS and US ReCS see References 3-9. 
 
Figure 2.  Fluid schematic and CAD layout of the 
Ares I First Stage Roll Control System 
  





Figure 3.  Fluid schematic and CAD layout of the Ares I Upper Stage Reaction Control System 
 
 
II. Technical Design Best Practices 
 
The following sections outline some of the major best practices incorporated and lessons learned during the 
design and development of the Ares I RoCS and ReCS.  As mentioned earlier, the NASA Design Team (NDT) was 
responsible for the design and development of the two systems, essentially serving the role of the traditional Prime 
Contractor.  The NDT consisted of both MSFC civil servants and contract employees from the Jacobs ESTS and 
Teledyne Brown technical services contract.  Initial planning and conceptual design for both systems began in 2006.  
Preliminary Design Reviews (PDR) for the RoCS and ReCS were conducted in 2008, and an integrated Interstage-
Upper Stage PDR was conducted in 2009.  Design work ended approximately half way to the Critical Design 
Review (CDR) in 2010, with an Interim Design Review (IDR).   
 
A. Integrated Product Team (IPT) Organizational Structure 
1. The larger the program, the more authority the IPT leadership needs to have  
If sufficient authority is not vested in the IPT leadership the structure can become more cumbersome with larger 
groups and projects, as there become more and more routes for decisions to be made and challenged.  Additionally, 
clear delineation of ownership responsibility needs to be defined early on.  The organizational structure at MSFC 
added complexity to the situation for the Ares I RCS designs.  The IPT consisted of engineers from various 
disciplines including systems, components, structural, thermal, Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C), safety, 
etc. that are all independent organizations (Branches with a Division) which have their own hierarchies (i.e. branch 
chief, team lead, engineer).  Integration of the individual disciplines into the IPT structure proved challenging, but 
overall was fairly effective, as there was consistent active engagement of the disciplines supporting the IPT.  One of 
the challenges with this approach was a resultant difficulty to prevent the accumulation of design margin within each 
technical area of responsibility.  An example of a challenge that arose due to this organizational structure was the 
maximum component temperature of 120°F.  This value was initially established by the IPT as a conservative value 
to insure access to a wide variety of commercially available components and materials.  However, the thermal 
analysis branch imposes 18°F margin for all programs based on their collective experience, leading to a very 
conservatively low maximum temperature.  This overly conservative value ended driving aspects of component and 
system design that likely could have been simplified had better definition of IPT authority been made earlier in the 
project.  Component and system level design and testing requirements also imposed an additional related 
qualification margin of 20°F, adding an additional level of margin and conservatism. 
 
2. Divide and conquer   
 The IPT was initially comprised of both FS RoCS and US ReCS teams, in order to maintain consistent design 
and development approaches, but later became cumbersome due to the size of the team.  Following PDR, the RCS 
IPT divided into separate FS RoCS and US ReCS Integrated Design Teams (IDT) to streamline the critical design of 
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the individual systems.  This proved to be a good approach and resulted in decreased meeting times with more 
targeted topics.  To ensure consistency was maintained at a higher level, an RCS Work Package Manager position 
was created to oversee continued development. 
 
3. As much as possible, push decision making authority down to the level of the subject matter experts / responsible 
discipline engineer 
To facilitate effective delegation, spend adequate time defining expectations and interfaces, as well as the 
reporting process and content, then focus on reviewing the results and not the detailed process.  Make decisions and 
mature designs.  Don’t be afraid to make initial decisions, based on all inputs available at that time; and don’t be 
afraid to revise those decisions, based on re-evaluation of all available updated inputs, even if there are impacts.  
Failure to make a decision is a bigger impact that making a decision that later needs to be updated. 
 
4. Establish working capabilities and functionalities, including margin, with major interfacing subsystems early, 
and constantly update 
For example, levels and margin for propulsion performance with GN&C need to be initially set well before 
GN&C is ready to commit formally to propulsion performance requirements, such that RCS propulsion design can 
start to mature.  Define required/expected products for reviews (and associated content) enough in advance to allow 
product generation. 
 
5. Independent Technical Experts with a tremendous amount of industry experience, frequently referred to as 
greybeards, can be very valuable in the early design process   
Seasoned, highly experienced RCS subject matter experts with decades of experience were brought in early in 
the design phase to provide invaluable guidance, lessons learned, and independent assessments for all aspects of the 
development of the RoCS and ReCS.  The greybeards were both integrated into the design process to provide 
frequent feedback, and available for separate consultation while performing various assessments and analyses.  The 
overall influence and impact of the greybeards led to a higher fidelity, more technically sound design. 
 
6. Configuration management is critical for diverse teams to stay up to date on system iterations   
Configuration management via a share site was instrumental in keeping the IPT up to date on the latest system 
configurations.  In addition to a log of decisional packages documenting system changes, the latest fluid system 
schematics, mass properties, power budgets, and pressure budgets were consistently updated to the most current 
version.  Notifications were sent to the entire IPT when any major product was updated.  The implementation of 
intermittent, formal Technical Interchange Meetings (TIM) ensured thorough and consistent products at reasonable 
intervals (6 to 9 months for this project) was invaluable for surfacing problems and issues that needed resolution.  
These meetings were conducted as internal reviews for synching up the integrated products for each subsystem, and 
not under the banner of a PDR or CDR. Finally, it is recommended to continue to implement new and improved 
technologies to facilitate communication for remote meetings, such as dynamic video conferencing, and improved 
share-tool training. However, webex/telecons for local team members should be minimized as much as feasible as 
this typically results in multi-tasking, which can decrease the efficiency and effectiveness meetings. 
 
B. System Design and Analysis 
1. Proactive coordination between disciplines was helpful in addressing areas of potential conflict early on to 
minimize unforeseen issues down the road   
An example was RCS offering the TPS 
team the opportunity to test candidate materials 
in RCS thruster plumes during early 
development tests.  This expedited the selection 
of candidate TPS materials with no real 
technical impact to the thruster test and 
relatively low cost for the TPS team.  The 
interface between the RCS IPT and the GN&C 
team was strong and facilitated rapid turn 
around for system impacts to fluctuations in the 
vehicle and mission requirements.  However, 
the interface with Avionics was an example of 
an interface that could have used more Figure 4: Insulated FS RoCS development thruster in 
hot-fire test cell with instrumented TPS plume 
impingement panel 
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nurturing.  Establishment of lighting strike and electromagnetic interference (EMI) requirements resulted in 
disjointed efforts to try to resolve the impacts to vehicle capability and component complexity.  To streamline the 
interface for analysts, consider including a technical liaison between designers and analysts to maintain consistency 
and minimize potentially conflicting inputs and interfaces.  Similarly ensure integration between subsystem and 
respective component expertise to ensure component designs support planned subsystem requirements and 
operations.  Also, early integration with the ground servicing and operations group is important - even early in the 
design process.  
 
2. Frequent changes in higher-level requirements led to frequent trade studies and there was not always sufficient 
time for adequate review   
An example was the thrust level and ultimate roll torque requirement for the RoCS.  As this requirement 
fluctuated, the RCS IPT would try to be proactive and assess changes to the system and component designs that 
could support the changes in the roll torque requirement.  However, because the requirement was undergoing 
frequent changes, it became difficult to continuously make changes to the RoCS design while still meeting overall 
schedule and milestones, so a line in the sand needed to eventually be drawn and agreed to by both GN&C and RCS.  
Additionally, some trades appeared to only be making incremental improvements when there may not have been 
sufficient rationale for reassessment.  Be sure to consistently be aware of the old adage - better is the enemy of good 
enough.  Time is always a critical resource and the more iterations that are required for review there will be an 
increased need for resources, less time to progress a functional design that meets requirements to CDR, or lead to 
not enough time for review which presents the risks of the design requiring even more iterations farther (and cost 
increase and schedule slip) down the road. 
 
3. High technical risk items were identified early on and advanced development or development programs were put 
in place to mitigate those risks   
 Examples included RoCS thruster proof-of-concept testing, component advanced-development, prototype 
thruster development, tank study contracts, system development test articles (SDTA), and thruster module and 
service valve panel vibration test articles.  See the Development Testing section below for more details. 
 
4. By PDR, initial flexibility stress analyses should be completed on lines and assemblies to identify problem areas  
 This effort should also include initial assumptions and basis for build tolerances in order to capture 
manufacturing and producibility aspects. Delays and a lack of manpower on RCS effort deferred these efforts with 
design impacts further along in the program. 
 
5. Launch vehicle applications and other special RCS applications (e.g., re-entry) need to have conservative 
vibration and shock levels defined early and the vehicle architecture should work to stay within these levels as it 
matures 
 Ares I subjected the vehicle to a significant vibration level increase following PDR, for which the RCS 
architecture really wasn’t designed.  This introduced significant RCS and US primary structure design complications 
to try to reduce vibration levels, translating into greater RCS assembly and US design complexity and sensitivities in 
other areas.  For example, if vibration levels are at risk for a significant increase or are out of family for a particular 
RCS architecture, RCS design should likely choose a conservative or more capable design to handle this vibration 
level. 
 
6. The vehicle should work to insure timely establishment of design-to interface requirements   
 Specifically, important RCS to primary structure requirements include thermal environments, physical 
deflections (static and dynamic, as well as thermal and other loads), and interface mating specifics and tolerances.  
These parameters were still not fully established and controlled by the vehicle at the time of US IDR for RCS 
interfaces, introducing significant design risk and schedule risk for the RCS CDR. Deflection of the primary 
structure could significantly impact both RoCS and ReCS, and in particular pressure vessel design, and therefore 
should be captured in procurement specifications to avoid significant cost and schedule impacts. 
 
7. Know and understand the safety and mission assurance requirements.   
 Address them in the subsystem and component designs, and when planning to deviate for these requirements, 








C. Component Design 
1. RCS systems should carefully consider series redundant thruster valve configurations, particularly where non-
heritage valve applications and/or high flowrates are incorporated 
 The RoCS application had significant cost, mass, envelope and schedule ramifications immediately upon 
incorporation.  In many instances there are other options to meet the standard fault tolerance requirements including 
manifold or tank isolation valves, pyro valves, and burst disks to name a few.  It is recommended that all reasonable 
options be explored prior to committing to a single architecture. 
 
2. Determine a reasonably conservative filter sizing methodology and implement it early in the design   
 After a very conservative initial sizing estimate was made, a significant amount of time was spent in developing 
a sizing methodology that was not overly conservative.  However, before a final methodology was determined, 
impacts from the initial approach and assumptions had led to ramifications in the system design that were too 
embedded in the system design to rationalize refining it (i.e. affected manifold layouts, thruster module and fairing 
footprint, and component specifications).   
 
3. Carefully determine maximum pressurization system component flowrates as well as capabilities of off-the-shelf 
hardware for demanding applications   
 In order to keep the Burst Disk, Relief Valve (BDRV) assembly to within heritage sizing (which was being sized 
for maximum failed regulator flowrate plus margin), a maximum flowrate had to be specified.  As the FS RoCS was 
a relatively high flowrate system, the maximum failed open regulator flowrate was near the boundary of existing 
heritage BDRV components capabilities.  This resulted in the supplier selecting a BDRV design at the top end of 
heritage flowrate capacity and incorporating a fairly complex flow limiter to the outlet of the GHe pressure regulator 
to stay within the selected BDRV’s operating range.  The flow limiter design then incurred additional challenges to 
system operation, requiring that the system would need to modify various modes of operation to insure that full 
performance and fault tolerance were maintained.  Due to the flow limiter design not being incorporated into the 
system until sometime after PDR, the system needed to make concessions as it was too far along in the contractual 
process to make the necessary component design changes to negate this issue. 
 
D. Requirements Definition And Planning  
1. Too much emphasis was placed on detailed requirements in the component specifications, which detracted from 
the overall progress of the system designs   
 Vendor contract provisions need to be in place to allow specification updates quickly, with low impacts, and 
allow for cost increases as the vendor interacts with NASA or a prime on requirements.  As requirements evolve, 
make sure to fully understand cost and schedule implications on the components.  Additionally, from the 
development of the detailed component specifications: 
• Deviation from initially defined documentation formats (specifically specifications) can lead to a significant 
amount of rework later in the program, which can be avoided. 
• When vendors cannot meet procurement spec requirements, flexibility both at the subsystem level and at the 
vendor levels is needed (both effectively incurring cost impacts) in order to best solve the related design 
issues; this may also include relaxation of imposed requirements in the best interest of both the subsystem 
and vendor to achieve a workable product. 
• Consider the use of a Technical Writer for grammatical and consistency comparison of technical documents 
and let the engineers focus on the technical content.   
• Ensure consistent integration of the designers throughout the specification formulation process, with specific 
emphasis on interfaces. 
• Use study contracts as surveys for initial design information until such time that selected flight component 
vendors can be placed on contract – fills gaps in understanding of available and new designs on components. 
• Emphasis on qualification planning and test article configurations should be dedicated to support PDR and 
elevated to the appropriate levels for release to support CDR. 
• Account for planned test and build activities (qualification, acceptance, and manufacturing/ground 
processing) in the design and capabilities of the subsystem and its components – don’t wait to consider and 
address these factors until CDR or even PDR. 
 
  
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
 
9 
2. Many early-derived requirements ended up being treated as though they were “set in stone” – allow for the 
iteration and evolution of derived requirements as higher-level requirements become more refined   
 It is good to set early derived requirements to keep the design process moving along, but they can add 
unnecessary complication farther down the road if not sufficiently allowed to evolve.  Frequently, more time was 
spent incorporating greater complexity into the RCS designs rather than challenging or relaxing the requirements. 
 
3. Thoroughly establish success criteria for completion required for each design milestone 
 If there are other IPTs that have interfacing influence (such as the RoCS and the Interstage), insure they are 
onboard with the approach and assumptions early to assist with creating achievable success criteria at the integrated 
vehicle-level.  Ensure that any discrepancies are closely tracked to closure. 
 
4. The system should progress to the development of detailed drawings around the time of PDR in order to mature 
details of design   
 CAD models are difficult to interpret in terms of manufacturing tolerances and manufacturing requirements, and 
details of drawings will better provide this manufacturing information (tolerances and requirements). 
 
5. Spend the time early in the program to develop a realistic budget margin   
 It became more and more apparent as the program progressed that very detailed and well thought out planning 
had gone into the initial (and revised) overall budget. Sufficient margin consistently appeared to be present as 
difficulties and complexities arose, requiring more resources.  Budget and definition is almost always a challenge 
and expending substantial effort early in the program to allow for anticipated margin can be a strong deciding factor 
in the program’s success and the system’s ultimate performance margin.  The FS RoCS did not have a strong 
heritage and historical precedence, and thus necessitated thorough planning to account for additional design, 
development, test and engineering that would be required.  Finally, when developing the budget margin, be sure to 
thoroughly assess the available skills base and factor in any needed variations to account for available resources and 
capabilities. 
 
E. Development Testing 
1. Utilize a strong in-house test program to facilitate the generation of component specifications, flesh-out system 
design issues, and anchor analytical models – place an early emphasis on “Test like you fly, fly like you test” 
 For components where there is limited heritage consider parallel development paths.  Especially for the RoCS, 
for which there was little historical precedence for a similar system, parallel design paths were pursued on higher 
complexity components like the series-redundant thruster valve and high pressure GHe regulator.  If the experience 
base with the selected technology or approach is limited, it is worthwhile to develop tools through development 
testing. 
A series of advanced development and formal development test programs were pursued to improve the fidelity 
of the early component and system designs, facilitated thorough the anchoring of analytical models to data using 
flight-like components.  Development programs included: 
• Advanced Development Hardware (ADH) Testing - Critical components were identified early and a test 
program was put in place to work with component vendors to build flight-like designs, based on top-level 
“fly-sheet” requirements, and test at MSFC.  For RoCS the GHe regulator and series-redundant thruster 
valve were identified as the most critical components and multiple sets of respective designs (4 regulator 
designs and 2 valve designs) from different vendors were designed, built and tested.  For ReCS the series-
redundant thruster valve was deemed most critical and three separate vendor designs were built and tested to 
help identify design constraints for the flight designs.  This work was conducted prior to PDR and greatly 
contributed to the development and generation of the detailed component specifications. 
• Vibration Test Articles – Due to the unique configuration of the Ares I, the predicted vibration and shock 
environments were relatively high compared to other manned launch vehicles.  The selection of 
monopropellant architectures for the RoCS and ReCS systems led to particular sensitivities for the thruster 
designs, which rely on a somewhat brittle catalyst to generate thrust.  This lead to various design features 
that were implemented into the system designs to reduce the vibration levels to the thrusters, which the 
catalyst would ultimately experience.  Such features included the use of elastomeric vibration isolators at the 
thruster module level, propellant manifold line routing that minimized loads into the thrusters, and high-
temperature flexible closeouts that attached from the thruster nozzles to the fairings.  Separate RoCS and 
ReCS thruster module vibration test articles were manufactured, following as close to the flight designs as 
possible.  They were then subjected to predicted flight random vibration and shock levels on vibration 
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shaker tables at MSFC, per the test setup shown below in Figure 5.  Test results demonstrated that the 
vibration isolation features would be sufficient to maintain levels at the thrusters similar to the vendors’ 
maximum heritage experience. 
 
  
Figure 5.  Thruster module vibration test article for FS RoCS on a vibration shaker table at MSFC 
 
• Thruster Prototype Development – Very early in the decisional process to select a monopropellant 
Hydrazine architecture over a bi-propellant architecture, it was decided to perform a proof-of-concept test 
for the FS RoCS thruster.  The primary rationale for the test was that there was very little historical 
precedence for a pulsed Hydrazine thruster at the intended flowrates.  The Marshall Roll Control Thruster 
(MRCT) program was therefore conducted in 2006, and upon completion and demonstration of feasible 
pulsing using a relatively large Hydrazine thruster, the decision was made to baseline the monopropellant 
RoCS architecture.  Following the MRCT program the RoCS Advanced Prototype Thruster program was 
put in place to optimize the MRCT design for pulsing operating, high vibration levels, and integration of a 
series-redundant valve design.  This program concluded with the successful development and testing of a 
thruster suitable for the demanding environments and mission requirements of the FS RoCS thruster, as 
shown below in Figure 6. 
 
  
Figure 6.  Vibration and hot-fire testing of the prototype FS RoCS thruster 
 
• System Development Test Articles (SDTA) - Full-scale system representations, using very similar 
volumes, materials, and layouts to the flight tanks and manifolds, incorporating components specifically 
designed for RoCS and ReCS, from the preceding component Advanced Development program were 
incorporated into the RoCS and ReCS SDTAs.  Both test articles, as installed in the test stands at MSFC, are 
shown below in Figure 7.  Helium was used as the pressurant along with water to simulate the propellant.  
Testing encompassed integrated system performance across a broad range of duty cycles, a variety of 
simulated mission profiles, and multiple simulated failure scenarios.   See References 5-9 for more detail on 
the Ares I RCS SDTA programs.  SDTA’s can be expensive, but if implemented into the program very early 
can save significant cost later in the program if issues arise and redesign / rework is required.  Typically the 
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most complex and difficult to predict interactions occur at the integrated system level, and the more testing 
that can be done to identify the system sensitivities early on, the less likely costly needed redesign will be 
discovered farther along in the design cycle.  Early integration of the system analysts during the test-
planning phase is crucial.  The analysts were integral in the design of the test articles, definition of the test 
procedures, and test and checkout on the test stand.  The close familiarity with the test articles allowed for 
rapid modification of the test matrices and reconfiguration of the test articles based on test results.  This 
approach minimized costly down time on the test stand and maximized the usefulness of the test articles and 
impact on the flight designs, including benchmarking of analytical models. 
 
  
Figure 7.  FS RoCS SDTA pressurization system and thruster module (left and middle) and ReCS SDTA 
thruster modules (right) at MSFC 
 
2. Other best practices used and lessons learned during the FS RoCS and US ReCS SDTA test programs: 
• Insure the use of localized filtration to protect sensitive and critical components  
• Specify the inclusion of daily, in-place calibration (also known as “shunt” calibration) into the requirements 
for the Data Acquisition and Control System (DACS). This can greatly reduce down time to verify 
instrumentation over multiday / week / month test programs. 
• The ability to rapidly turn around data from the DACS to the Test Requestor, during long continuous test 
programs is important for tracking the real-time completion of test objectives  
• Specify response characteristics of instrumentation in fast-acting systems to avoid interference with test 
article harmonics  
• Specify accuracy of instrumentation and/or intent of measurement with test facility to insure selected 
instrumentation can satisfy objectives  
• Design test schedule to be flexible in order to deal with problems as they arise and not result in lengthy 
schedule delays  
• Schedule repeated data reviews throughout testing, even if you can only afford short review periods, to 
minimize the amount of re-testing or uncompleted test objectives  
• Maintain and update a sequential test log and include any daily notes / observations. It is much more difficult 
to recall after the fact and best done while results and observations are fresh in your memory  
• Insure early pre-coordination with Safety and Stress / Structural organizations to avoid lengthy schedule 
delays for required detailed assessments  
• Make sure all development hardware has well documented prior test history, material properties, operational 
constraints, etc.  For limited life item components, be sure to accurately track cycles and usage conditions 
• As much as is feasible, arrange test matrix in groupings of hardware changes to minimize the required 
number of changes  
• The number one issue with planning a test, especially when pressurized vessels are involved, is safety. Safety 
protocol must be implemented into test procedures early, because test article access may be limited when 
the system is pressurized. 
• Real time data collection should be reviewed by a system analyst to ensure that data on ensuing tests is 
acceptable. 
• When troubleshooting one issue, be aware of additional issues and work in parallel if possible. 
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• Include voltage measurements when trying to understand solenoid valve performance criteria. 
• When troubleshooting, communicate to key stakeholders the reasoning behind each new action. 
• Identify all expectations to the test conductor up front and in writing to prevent miscommunication. 
• Ensure that all technical advisors are involved during the planning phase to provide input before testing 
begins. Provide adequate time for advisors to review test plans. 
• Prepare contingency plans to continue the testing flow with alternate test sequences should data results differ 
from what was expected. The SDTA configuration allowed for multiple test configurations for various 
areas of the system. If an issue were to arise with a particular measurement or set of data the test procedure 
could be altered to continue testing on a different area of the system while the unexpected data was 
reviewed. 
• Document, Document, Document! An enormous amount of useful data can be recorded, but test conditions 
and procedure changes must be documented in order to understand and utilize the data. Prior to testing 




III. Boeing Producibility Best Practices 
 
A. Scope  
The Boeing Company was selected by NASA on August 28, 2007 to be the contractor providing manufacturing 
support for design and construction of the Ares I Upper Stage (US).  This put into motion the Ares I Upper Stage 
Production Contract (USPC), which resulted from a full and open competition with a period of performance 
beginning September 1, 2007 through December 31, 2016.  Boeing was tasked to provide support to a NASA-led 
design team during the design phase with responsibility for the production of the Ares I US.  This including the 
manufacturing of a ground test article, three vehicle flight test units and six production flight units to support 
NASA’s flight manifest through 2016.  Final assembly of the US would have taken place at NASA’s Michoud 
Assembly Facility (MAF) in New Orleans, Louisiana. 
 
B. Source Control Items 
 In support of the FS RoCS and US ReCS NDT, Boeing began a source selection process with vendors for all 
components, also known as Source Control Items (SCIs), specified by the NDT for each system.  The vendors for 
each component were selected by Boeing and put onto contract to begin development of each SCI using the 
provided SCI specification.  Using the design information provided in the SCI specification, the vendors began the 
necessary Design, Development, Test and Evaluation (DDT&E) needed to meet the requirements.  Upon, 
completion of the flight development phase, the SCI flight qualification phase was planned to begin and a full 
shipset of each FS RoCS and US ReCS SCI was planned for delivery to the NDT for use in the subsystem 
environmental and full system level hot fire qualification testing. 
 
Boeing was responsible for the following specific roles in the development of the FS RoCS and US ReCS SCIs: 
• The design, development and/or procuring, qualification and certification of each SCI while providing the 
NDT insight for all SCI DDT&E. 
• The hardware required to manufacture, assemble, checkout, and test all FS RoCS and US ReCS integrated 
test articles, simulation of test article operation including SCIs commanded by the US Avionics system, and 
the flight units. 
• Providing inputs aiding the NDT in the development of the SCI specifications. 
• Maintaining the configuration control of all SCI specifications and related interface documents. 
• Providing certification data for all FS RoCS and US ReCS SCIs. 











Figure 8.  CAD representations of the various RoCS and ReCS components.  Clockwise from the top left: 
US ReCS thruster assembly, service valve, RoCS propellant tank, ReCS propellant tank, RoCS BDRV 
assembly, RoCS GHe manual valve, RoCS GHe pressurant module, and manifold pressure transducer 
 
C. Producibility, Manufacturing And Test Support 
The other primary role that Boeing played in support of the FS RoCS and US ReCS NDT was in the areas of 
producibility, manufacturing and test.  Boeing was well suited to support the NDT in these roles based on their vast 
knowledge of producing large scale products such as commercial airplanes, military aircraft, satellites and rockets.  
Weekly meetings were held focusing on producibility of both the FS RoCS and US ReCS in an effort to streamline 
their designs, making them easier to manufacture and more affordable to assemble and test.  Specific focus was 
place on the details of how each system would be assembled, which included taking into account the total number of 
welds, tubing bends and fittings used attempting to make these areas lean.  To further support this work, Boeing, 
applied knowledge gained from the Space Shuttle and Delta programs in an attempt to drive down unnecessary 
touch time and cost.   
 
Boeing was responsible for the following specific roles related to the producibility, manufacture and test support 
of the FS RoCS and US ReCS: 
• Providing producibility engineering support to the FS RoCS and US ReCS IDTs through participation in the 
design and development process. 
• Participating in the design and development process of the FS RoCS and US ReCS, including:  development 
of analytical models, development of CAD designs which define the subsystem/vehicle/SCI interfaces, 
maintenance of subsystem requirements documents and subsystem development plans and supporting 
documents. 
• Providing inputs to the NDT via a series of Technical Interchange Meetings. 
• Manufacture and assemble the FS RoCS and US ReCS Hot Fire Test Articles (HFTA) in accordance with the 
NASA design.  Deliver HFTAs to the NDT for testing of all components along with both test articles. 
• Manufacture and assemble the FS RoCS and US ReCS Thruster Module Qualification Test Assemblies in 
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D. Task Orders 
Over the course of the Ares I program, Boeing was requested by the NDT to performed additional technical work 
in support a variety of goals that the NDT did not have the manpower to complete in a timely manner.  The process 
used to complete this technical work for the NDT was called task orders.  Task orders included specific technical 
direction that bounded the work Boeing was requested to complete in the scheduled timeframe.  Requested NDT 
task order direction included the following detailed work: 
 
1. FS RoCS and US ReCS Component And Verification Assessment 
Assessments of component verification early in a propulsion system design provide a significant head start in 
the verification process, which often is an area that lags behind on programs.  A component survey was 
performed to assess the feasibility of component procurement for the Ares I program.  Request for Information 
(RFI) packages were released for all SCI components to evaluate overall design feasibility, identification of 
specification requirements that carry significant technical risk or verification difficulty, identification of heritage 
hardware that might be used to reduce development cost or risk, and the feasibility of the Boeing hardware delivery 
schedule required to meet key NASA milestones.  Draft NASA specifications accompanied the RFI packages in 
order to gain valuable feedback on the requirement and verification sections in an attempt to help the specification 
authors produce a cleaner product.  In general, all of the SCI’s were considered feasible with the exception of the 
Burst Disk/Relief Valve and the Helium Regulator. The concern with these two components was that some 
tolerances were excessively tight, with the burst disk being the worst.  
Both of these issues have been brought to the attention of NASA, and Boeing and the NASA ER33 Component 
Group have been working together to adjust the tolerance bands of the regulator-burst disk-relief valve system 
within the limitations of the system design to alleviate excessive development risk. This effort is improving the 
tolerance range, but is still on-going.  The other remaining system components were all considered feasible with a 
typical level of effort in-line with components used in past manned flight applications.  Numerous comments were 
provided, but there were no requirements that were considered a significant risk of technical failure.  Evaluation of 
heritage hardware potential was difficult. Due to the unique launch environments, high flow rates and system 
pressures, it was difficult to identify existing components that met the Ares I requirements. The SCI with the highest 
likelihood of heritage commonality are the Service Valves, Helium Tank and the Upper Stage Propellant Tank. Most 
suppliers indicated that a heritage design would likely be a starting point for the Ares I component, and this could 
potentially result in schedule and cost savings, although the impact will likely be minimal. 
Finally, Boeing support was provided to assist in the definition of verification methods for all subsystem 
requirements. Tasks accomplished included: 
• Populated verification methods (Analysis, Demonstration, Inspection, and/or Test) in both the FS RoCS and 
US ReCS Subsystem Design Specifications Verification Cross Reference Matrices (VCRM).  
• Populated sections 4.2 through 4.4 of the two subsystem specifications with verification objectives and 
identification of success criteria,  
• Developed an excel spreadsheet that will be used as a preliminary tool to further mature both the subsystem 
and component verification methods, definition of verification work to be performed, and the success 
criteria that determines when the verification is complete.  
 
Completion of the above tasks has afforded the NDT with a significant head-start in the verification process 
which on other programs has often been an area that lags behind.  Identifying verification methods, objectives, and 
success criteria early in the program can only help reduce the chances of costly “I-forgots” in terms of dollars and 
schedule. Then Boeing conducted a line-by-line, requirement-by-requirement review to determine if each 
requirement was verifiable and if the verification methods and statements were adequate.  A sit down, face-to-face 
meeting was then conducted with each NDT responsible engineer to redline the component specifications resulting 
in a significantly improved specification in terms of both the section 3 requirements and section 4 verification 
requirements. 
 
2. FS RoCS and US ReCS Thruster Module Assessment 
Early design producibility assessments have the potential to reduce propulsion system weight, number of 
parts, cost, production schedule along with assembly time and checkout tests.  This report presents the analysis 
products of an Integrated Product Team of Aerodynamics, Aero-Acoustics, Aeroheating, Plume Heating, Thermal, 
Dynamics, Loads, Stress, Design, Materials & Processes (M&P) and Propulsion disciplines which assessed the FS 
RoCS thruster module design to develop PDR design tools, provide design assessments, and provide 
recommendations to the baseline and alternative concepts that reduce flight environments to the propulsion 
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hardware.  The Aerodynamic effort established efficient CFD models, which demonstrated similar results with 
respect to the NDT baseline fairings and has assessed alternate fairing shapes which offer the option of reducing the 
protuberance Overall Sound Pressure Level (OASPL). Wind tunnel test data was unavailable to validate the 
specified protuberance OASPL; therefore, an alternative approach, which entailed the application of Space Shuttle 
OMS Pod OASPL data, was applied to various fairing shapes and relative locations to present potential 
improvements in thrust module random vibration levels. A Boeing analytical methodology was applied for deriving 
reduced SPLs and iterations on fairing shapes indicated that improved random vibration levels to the propulsion 
hardware were possible.  
The Aerothermal effort assessed the ascent flight trajectory and the worst case mission duty cycle to develop 
both aeroheating and plume heating environments for the RoCS and ReCS.  These two efforts developed working 
models that provided a comparison to the NDT results.  The aeroheating and plume heating environments for 
simultaneously firing thrusters were integrated based on the worst case mission duty cycle and provided for selected 
regions on the fairing and thruster close-out.  Results revealed that the heat fluxes had the least sensitive design 
concerns on the thruster module relative to the random vibration environments.  Recommended analyses for CDR, 
such as the use of wind tunnel and flight test data, were defined to assure the maturity of the results will mitigate any 
potential temperature violations on the fairing and thruster close-out. 
Thermal modeling of the fairing structure, nozzle close-out, fairing close-out, frame structure and propellant line 
layout have been developed for the thruster modules.  The aeroheating and plume heating environments and ablation 
techniques are applied to determine the peak temperature distributions on each fairing concept.  Worst case 
temperature distributions and critical hot spots on the fairings are provided. At this time, no temperature violations 
have been identified.  Recommendations are made to further mature the PDR results and to finalize the 
recommended heat flux levels that should be applied to the forward module insulation to assure that no other 
potential heat fluxes could cause appreciable temperature increases that may violate requirements.  The 
establishment of these models provides the NDT with independent analytical tool to support the integrity and 
fidelity of the Thruster Module design from PDR to CDR. 
The Dynamics and Load analysis effort utilized OMS Pod OASPL measured data and alternate fairing sound 
pressure level reductions to derive reduced random vibration levels at the base plate location.  The analysis tool for 
this effort was the Statistical Energy Analysis (SEA) technique applied to the Hybrid DAC2 Model.  Alternative 
Fairing attachment concepts were identified which changes the flow of random vibration energy resulting in reduced 
random vibration levels at the baseplate and to the propulsion hardware.  Use of the SEA demonstrates reductions in 
random vibration levels over the NDT technique; however, reductions in the OASPL may not be fully realized as 
random vibration reductions due to the increase in alternate fairing surface area.  Recommendations are to iterate on 
a fairing shape that defines the SPL reduction vs. increased surface area threshold to realize additional potential 
improvements.  
A hybrid SEA model was used to assess the shock environment due to the interstage separation event. The model 
predicted good agreement with results from traditional empirical approaches.  The model allows response recovery 
at specific internal locations within the RoCS and ReCS Thruster Modules.  The use of constrained layer damping 
treatments on the fairings was investigated for reductions in the transmissibility of random vibration environment. 
The results indicate that significant response attenuation can be achieved through the use of specific treatments. 
Various isolation concepts were identified for attenuating the response at the RoCS and ReCS Thruster Modules.  
Two candidate isolator parameters are recommended that can help to resolve the conflicting requirements of 
isolation performance and the required thruster pointing accuracy. 
The Stress Analysis effort began with Finite Element Models of the propellant line and thrust module structure 
supplied by NDT.  Alternative design concepts for the thrust framing and propellant feed line routings have been 
explored. The team has evaluated a concept, developed a model, developed element loads and deflections as a first 
step in performing detail analysis.  A comparison study between isolators at the thruster interface and at the 
baseplate interface was also performed.  Results of the study indicate reduced flow in energy to the thruster, if the 
isolators are mounted at the baseplate interface to the interstage.  The evaluated design concept shows positive 
margins for both the thrust module and feed line assemblies. Further detailed analysis is required to size the 
hardware. 
A design and manufacturing assessment was performed on the baseline concept.  This effort involved evaluation 
of the NDT CAD models and involved the analysis of the proposed design for production of subassemblies and 
integration of module hardware.  Recommendations that enhance production of the assembly have been provided 
which includes alternative concepts.  Specifically, in the design of the propellant manifold, several options, which 
assist in meeting system requirements, have been recommended.  In the area of the fairing design, recommendations 
are offered which reduce random vibration levels on the hardware.  For the engine closeout, reduction of part count 
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and recommendations on final assembly are suggested.  Forward planning is recommended in order to address the 
realization of reduce random vibration levels. 
The integrated thermal assessment for the RoCS and ReCS presents resolvable design concerns; however, 
recommendations to deliver better performance are identified.  The available NDT aeroheating and plume heating 
environments have been evaluated as satisfactory, but there are still sections of data missing, such as RoCS and 
ReCS plume radiation heating and J-2X and USM plume heating environments.  These are recommended as forward 
work.  Once these elements are provided, a comprehensive set of aeroheating and plume heating environment 
assessments can be completed with additional recommendations to improve the RoCS and ReCS design. 
For the FS RoCS, a material assessment of the close-out considered Nextel/Saffil and Nextel/Dyna-flex 
combinations; the thermal material assessment revealed similar properties. As a result, Nextel/Saffil combinations 
were analyzed.  The temperature limit of the Nextel/Saffil closeout material was not exceeded (< 2600 oF). Analysis 
of the thruster can without internal insulation revealed this is not a feasible option: the worst case conditions 
predicted a maximum temperature of 1722°F.  At this stage of the analysis, the insulated Thruster Can exceeds the 
Can limit of 350 °F (~ up to 1455°F). These temperatures occur near the closeout.  Additional gridding of the 
Thruster Can will assist the mitigation of the limit violation.  With a maximum interface temperature of 120 ºF at the 
Fairing Close-out, a perform seal around the fairing interface with the interstage structure will prevent hot gas from 
entering the module during flight, maintain ambient conditions inside the module and prevent temperature 
violations. 
The ReCS thruster module closeout design effort concluded that Nextel 312 (fabric-ceramic fiber 312) and Saffil 
(fibrous alumina-silica batting material) can be used to prevent high temperature thruster exhaust gases from 
entering the fairing cavity at the thruster nozzle penetration point.  To prevent hot gases from entering the fairing 
module at the base plate intersection, Room Temperature Vulcanizing Elastomer (RTV-560) can be applied at this 
junction. An area of concern is the interface of the fairing structure and the thruster nozzle close-out.  The fairing 
has a relatively low limit of 120°F, and the nozzle exterior interface can exceed 500°F.  A comprehensive thermal 
model was developed with inputs from the above mentioned fairing and thruster analyses to perform the ReCS 
thruster fluid line analysis.  The analysis determined that no fluid propellant lines exceeded their allowable upper 
temperature limit.  Some component temperatures are near their maximum allowable upper limits, and if any 
changes are made to the external environments that exacerbate the overall thermal response of the ReCS, some 
issues may arise. 
A comprehensive thermal model was developed with inputs from the above mentioned fairing and thruster 
analyses to perform the RoCS thruster fluid line analysis.  The analysis determined that no fluid propellant lines 
exceeded their allowable upper temperature limit.  Some component temperatures are near their maximum allowable 
upper limits, and if any changes are made to the external environments that exacerbate the overall thermal response 
of the RoCS, some issues may arise. 
Thermal modeling of the fairing structure, nozzle close-out, fairing close-out, frame structure and propellant line 
layout have been developed for the thruster modules.  The aeroheating and plume heating environments and ablation 
techniques are applied to determine the peak temperature distributions on each fairing.  Worst Case Temperature 
distributions and Critical Hot Spots on the fairings are provided.  At this time only a minor temperature violation of 
the ReCS thruster module top wall has been identified.  Recommendations are made to further mature the PDR 
results and to assure that no other potential heat fluxes could cause appreciable temperature increases that may 
violate requirements.  The establishment of these models provides the NDT with independent analytical tools to 
support the integrity and fidelity of the Thruster Module Design from PDR to CDR. 
As a result of this investigation, the Boeing Team has established the technical knowledge base and modeling 
tools to further mature the potential benefits identified in this report.  It has embarked upon the detailed analysis that 
will allow the NDT team to realize potential vehicle performance benefits and/or pursue alternate design 
recommendations.  The current analytical tools are available to perform independent assessments of N2H4 Propellant 
Lines, Fairing-to- Nozzle Close-Out, Fairing-to-Interstage or Thrust Cone Close-Out, and Fairings.  The objective of 
this assessment has been to reduce the energy transmitted to the propulsion hardware and to identify alternative 
design solutions that reduce weight, numbers of parts, cost, production schedule, assembly time and checkout tests. 
 
3. FS RoCS and US ReCS Fairing Closeout Trade Study 
The final closeout between the thruster and the external surface of the vehicle may require a unique design 
implementation, and its design should not be neglected in the early design phases.  In support of the NDT, Boeing 
was asked to conduct a trade study that identified preliminary Fairing close-out concepts for study along with an 
evaluation of candidate material options.  After evaluation of material used in high temperature applications (~2600 
°F), three materials (BF20 (Nextel 440), AF20 (Nextel 312) 3M Products, and a Boeing AB 312) along with two 
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close-out design concepts were considered.  Materials BF20 (Nextel 440) and AF20 (Nextel 312) are commercial 
low cost type fabrics while AB 312 is a Space Shuttle custom weave heritage fabric. Concept 1 is a simplistic 
thermal fabric applied across the close-out opening which was considered with a draped feature to provide the 
compliance needed for the relative motion between the fairing and the Thruster nozzle. Concept 2 is a combination 
of an alumina fiber (Saffil) insulator wrapped within a Nextel Fabric blanket to provide a thermal barrier. The 
draped feature was also considered for concept 2 to provide the needed relative motion compliance. Next, these 
options were compared against the following criteria: 





Utilizing inputs from a supplier, lessons learned from a prototype blanket found in Figure 9 along with thermal 
and structural analyses it was concluded that: 
• TPS is required at the fairing close-out interface to limit the fairing temperature below 120 °F. 
• The highest close-out surface temperature exhibited on RoCS and ReCS concept 1 was 1714 °F/765 °F, 
respectively using AB 312. 
• The highest close-out surface temperature exhibited on RoCS and ReCS concept 2 was 1941 °F/875 °F, 
respectively using AB 312. 
• Strength analysis showed two layers of either Nextel 312 or 440 (minimum 0.02" ply thickness) will be 
required to meet the worst case pressure loads of -7±2 psid Crush to +10±2 psid Burst. 
• If a two-edge constraint attachment feature is considered with a single fabric, a 0.23" to 0.40" of Nextel 
material would be required for the RoCS/ReCS respectively. 
• To address the current deflections between the fairing and nozzle, the close-out blanket will need to be 
flexible enough to provide the required compliance. 
o The RoCS compliance required are 0.313” lateral and 0.393” axial. 
o The ReCS compliance required are 0.172" lateral and 0.234" axial. 
 
       
 
Figure 9. Prototype of Saffil Wrapped with Nextel (Donut Concept) 
 
The thermal performance for AB312 was determined to not be better than Nextel 440 while its manufacturing 
cost and schedule was also expected to be much greater than Nextel 440. Based on the high FS RoCS surface 
temperatures (~1941 °F) and the fact that the Nextel 440 fabrics have greater strength retention than the Nextel 312 
fabrics, it was determined that the Nextel 440 (3M BF20) would be the best choice material in a loose/draped 
blanket concept.  This conclusion is based on a two-edge constraint concept which can limit the relative motion 
between the fairing and nozzle.  Due to this finding, a single edge constraint option with the appropriate thickness 
for strength can be considered for a future close-out design study. This feature will allow relative motion between 
the nozzle and the fairing and will meet the required compliance.  
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Also, the single edge constrain option will required a compressive fit feature and will require a stiffness to 
determine a minimum load transmission to the nozzles.  It should be noted that, as the Nextel material thickens, the 
flexibility required to meet compliance diminishes. Because the deflections are preliminary, the two candidate 
options were recommended for study to address compliance/flexibility vs. transmission of load to the nozzles. The 
thermal and compliance performances are heavily dependent on configuration, and, therefore, a correct material with 
proper designs would be able to resolve the thermal and compliance requirement. 
 
4. FS RoCS and US ReCS Fairing Material Trade Study 
Material trade studies based on appropriate Figures of Merit can result in the implementation of the best 
design material needed.  A Fairing material trade study was conducted involving various metals (Aluminum, 
Titanium, Inconel, and AlBeMet) coupled with several fabrication process options along with the use of a composite 
as a separate material of choice.  The trade study had primary Figures of Merit (FOM) that included Safety (10%), 
Programmatic (40%), and Technical (50%).  Based on the initial weightings in the trade study analysis tool, which 
favors the mass measure FOM at 35%, the composite material would be the material of choice as noted in Table 1 
(109%), Baseline Option. 
 
Table 1: Baseline Material Option Result 
 
 
It should be noted that this result assumes the following: 
• The material database is well established and released for the choice of composite fabric, there will be no 
impact to the design and/or drawing release dates due to material property data not being well defined. The 
material database will affect the margin carried forward into the final design and thus affect the weight 
savings. 
• A path forward to address the lightning strike requirement is in place. 
• A path forward to address the ascent debris impact requirement is in place. 
• A path forward to address the Proof Load test requirement for composites is in place. 
 
Without these paths clearly identified and the issues resolved in time to meet schedule, the use of an all 
composite fairing would not win out in the baseline study. This is identified in Table 2 below as an option that 
drives risk as a critical factor. 
 
Table 2: Emphasis on Risk Result 
 
 
The reason Titanium ranks better on risk is because of its resilience to strength, temperature and fabrication 
processes established. Should the ascent debris requirement govern, the titanium will out rank composite and 
aluminum in strength and impact. In addition, the fabrication processes for Titanium are less forgiving to impact 
damage. 
Parametric trades driving either Programmatic and/or additional Technical FOMs were also performed to 
understand the sensitivity of the material choice to these measures. Results indicate, that as Programmatic measures 
vary, the use of a composite material is still the preferred choice, except for the case where additional costs get 
added for 
In general, the three following conclusions can be drawn from the trade study: 
• From a producibility standpoint, the ReCS and RoCS Fairings can be made by most of the materials studied 
and can be fabricated in the time frame desired. 
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• From a cost standpoint, the ReCS and RoCS Fairings can be made competitively by the assembled aluminum 
sheet metal using aluminum casting methods.  The Fairings can also be made of composites competitively 
by composites suppliers. 
• From a schedule standpoint, most of the fabrication processes for both Fairings can be met if ordered within 
14 months. 
 
Additionally, the NDT might want to consider the following options. 
• A “Hybrid” fairing that produces the leading edge out of Titanium and the remaining structure out of 
composites. This would provide the lightest weight option with the best structural resilience. 
• Producing the ReCS and RoCS fairings from different materials since each fairing has a specific value on the 
Mass to Orbit calculation carried at the vehicle level. 
 
In summary, if weight is driving the material selection process (as assumed in the baseline trade summary 
results), the composite material option is the most favorable choice, if the least cost approach drives the material 
selection process then the Cast Aluminum is the most favorable choice, if structural resilience (impact resistance) 
drives the material selection process then Titanium is the most favorable choice. Other NDT considerations can 
drive the selections as well, depending on the relative importance of any one weighted measure. The measures 
presented in the report provide the directed response need to make the material selection given the relative 
importance of each of the weighted measures. With the NDTs input into the relative importance of the weighted 
measures, a favorable material choice can be made. 
 
5. US ReCS Crowned Fairing And Close-Out Preliminary Assessment 
Following US ReCS PDR, the NDT requested that Boeing review the Fairing design and provide a 
recommendation regarding material, shape, manufacturing and assembly.  Based on the review, Boeing provided a 
recommendation that the Fairing should be made of Aluminum SP2195-T5 while also being crowned.  Detailed 
analysis showed that the crowned aluminum fairing concept is superior to that of the o-give configuration previously 
analyzed in terms of being lighter along with its curved shape providing additional stiffness. The drawback to the 
design is that the shape of the crowed Fairing can complicates the close-out geometry and design relative to the 
thruster nozzles. 
The crowned Fairing concept was analyzed for its impact to aero-heating derived loading conditions, aero-
dynamic derived loading conditions and then assessed structurally against the new environmental loading 
conditions.  The structural analysis of the crowned Fairing concept has shown that for the combined loading cases of 
enforced deflections, accelerations, and aero-dynamic pressures the design maintains positive margins in all 
categories (buckling/stability, stress, and deflections) using prototype factors of safety.  A thermal knockdown in 
material allowable was used when writing margins with the maximum thermal knockdown temperature assumed to 
be 120 °F.  This is lower than the specification value of 150 °F but is consistent with the time frame at which the 
maximum pressure occurs.  Boeing believes the crowned Fairing concept is ideal for this application and 
recommends using super plastic forming as the manufacturing process.  Additional detailed analyses of the side 
panels, mechanical close-out parts, and fastening features used throughout the design will need to be evolved and 
analyzed to complete the design process. 
 
E. Best Practices 
One of the biggest lessons Boeing learned from supporting the Ares I FS RoCS and US ReCS NDT is the 
importance of focusing on affordability throughout the duration of a program.  The best way to accomplish this is to 
make affordability a priority from the beginning of a program.  A key way of implementing this is by clearly 
defining the program’s performance requirements early with all parties in agreement.  With the program 
requirements understood and agreed to, the team can work together to create a design that meets performance 
requirements and minimizes cost without sacrificing safety.  Efficiency must be a priority to everyone who is a part 
of the program and should be included in our every day process and hardware design choices.  The following 
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• Goals should be common across the program. 
o The following items should be considered in the order listed:  safety, cost, schedule and performance. 
o Consider locating key team members, such as designers, system engineers, analyst, manufacturing 
engineers and test engineers together to build an effective team and ensure that affordability it a key 
driver. 
• Make all IPT boundaries efficient, where communication and support is not limited to individual groups, but 
is program wide.  Drive synergy across IPT boundaries – efficiencies should be program wide not limited to 
individual groups 
• Before procuring hardware clearly defined all requirements, especially key environments that can drive 
suppliers away from heritage engineering approaches and methods.   
o Traceable to upper level requirements using a requirements database such as CRADLE or DOORS 
o  Standard method for evaluating Requests For Information (RFI) data and applying a correction factor to 
account for fidelity of data to avoid underestimation of costs 
• Defined an executable schedule at the beginning of the program. 
• At the beginning of a program key processes should be defined and in-place.   
o Also, the ability should be in place to quickly change any processes that are not meeting the required 
performance. 
• Develop standard Supplier Statement of Work (SSOW) template, which allows custom tailoring based on 
specific application 
o Detailed Tailoring Guide that provides rationale for requirements as well as rationale to help guide 
authors to properly tailor 
o Detailed review process for SSOW release that ensures tailoring was properly performed 
 
IV.  NASA-Boeing Team 
 
Traditionally, the Prime Contractor (the NDT in this case) has the leverage to make design changes and directly 
affect the contract of the component suppliers.  In this instance, Boeing served as the liaison between the Prime and 
the vendors, and thus a more circuitous route had to be taken to flow requirements changes down to the vendors. 
 
 
1. Recurring producibility meetings were instrumental in developing cost-effective, manufacturable designs   
 Early on meetings were incorporated that specifically focused on improving the produceability aspects of the 
RoCS and ReCS hardware and components.  These meetings leveraged Boeing’s vast corporate experience to apply 
manufacturing and design methodologies used in other areas such as aviation and satellite design, to the RoCS and 
ReCS designs. 
 
2. Cost neutral changes were an effective approach to make critical component design modifications while not 
growing costs   
 As is the case with many programs, once component vendors are on-contract and in place it becomes more and 
more difficult to both request and receive new funds, as well as make technical changes without incurring significant 
cost.  This can leave the system design in a difficult place to accept inadequacies and potentially not meet intended 
performance levels.  For Ares the approach between NASA, Boeing, and the component vendors to prioritize design 
deficiencies and areas of conservative margin, and make give-and-take type changes to the component designs that 
would ultimately result in cost neutral changes. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
In summary, there were many best practices used and lessons learned throughout the development of the Ares I 
FS RoCS and US ReCS propulsion systems that will be applicable to many future programs.  This activity was 
comprised of a non-traditional structure in which the Government led the design and development of the systems 
and an industry partner, Boeing, was responsible for component selection, procurement, and production.  It served as 
an invaluable opportunity for NASA to regain some of the first-hand design experience that has not be available to 
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